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Abstract**
 
This article provides a survey of one major development in family law in the United States that has occurred 
during the most recent past. This development is the change that has occurred in marriage-like relationships. 
The article begins with a discussion of contract cohabitation and the extent to which it reflected a change from 
traditional views of formal or informal marriage as the only legally acceptable model for adults who desired to 
live together. It shows how contract cohabitation laid the groundwork for the establishment of domestic 
partnership laws. These laws were first adopted by municipalities and then by states to cover same-sex 
relationships and then served as a predicate for civil union legislation. That legislation in turn provided a legal 
model for recognizing same-sex relationships short of marriage. The article provides an analysis and critique of 
provisions (which are reproduced) dealing with domestic partnerships of the Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution proposed by the American Law Institute in 2000. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
1. Introduction
2. Contract cohabitation
3. The ALI principles on domestic partnerships
4. Registered domestic partnerships
5. Beyond: same-sex marriage
6. References
                                                 
** This presentation was made on May 10, 2006 before the Faculty of Law at the University of Girona, Girona, Spain. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In my thinking about family law, I have organized the issues in the field by considering three 
processes: the process of establishing, of maintaining and of terminating or reorganizing domestic 
relationships1. For example, laws dealing with forming marriage and marriage-like relationships 
would fall under the heading of establishing relationships, laws dealing with on-going relationships 
fall under the heading of maintaining those relationships and terminating a marriage or marriage-
like relationship would fall under the last category. In this presentation I shall be discussing those 
developments in establishing adult marriage-like relationships that began in the 1970s and were 
carried forward to the beginning of the new century. For the most part, the changes that took place 
were begun by state courts and the creativity of lawyers and were followed by the actions of state 
legislatures. These developments changed the direction of family law in the United States.  
 
In conducting research in FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA, I was struck by the fact that it was not until about 
two or three decades following World War II that laws regulating family life took a different 
direction. I am not quite sure why, but I am inclined to think that both state courts and state 
legislatures began to take a more realistic view of societal changes having been convinced by legal 
arguments and social science data that change was necessary and they reflected those changes in 
ground-breaking decisions and new legislation. 
 
 
2. Contract cohabitation 
 
In 1976, the California Supreme Court decided the case of Marvin v. Marvin2, which I consider one of 
the most important family law decisions handed down by a state supreme court in the decade of the 
1970s. Basically, that case recognized a social reality. The facts in Marvin involve Lee Marvin, the 
Hollywood actor and his companion, Michelle, who lived together as a couple, having begun that 
relationship while Lee was married to another woman. Early in the relationship, Lee divorced his 
wife and continued living with Michelle who changed her name legally to Michelle Marvin. Lee and 
Michelle lived together for six years, never having gone through a formal marriage ceremony. Had 
California recognized common law marriage, an informal marriage requiring the living together of a 
couple and their holding themselves out to the community that they were married, it is possible that 
Lee and Michelle could have held the status of husband and wife under a common law marriage. 
However, California had abolished that status in 1895, a fact the California Supreme Court makes in 
a footnote and states that it does not wish to resurrect common law marriage by its decision. 
 
                                                 
1 I have explained these processes in my book, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 9 ( 2003). 
2 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
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Under traditional family law, which did not recognize any form of friendship as having legal 
consequences, there would be no legal remedy available to a person in Michelle Marvin’s position. It 
was probably a long shot for her lawyer to seek redress in the California courts. Yet that is what he 
did. Michelle Marvin’s lawyer sued to determine Michelle’s contractual and property rights by way 
of declaratory relief. In her complaint, Michelle alleged that she and Lee had had an oral agreement 
in which they promised to hold themselves out as married and to share in his economic wealth. 
Specifically, Michelle sought to have the court impose a constructive trust on half of the couple’s 
property that was acquired during their years of cohabitation. The trial court denied Michelle’s 
request, and she appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of California. That court reversed the 
trial court’s decision, and held that Michelle did have a cause of action for breach of an express 
contract of cohabitation. It remanded the case to the trial court in order for her to present facts 
sufficient to prove a cause of action in contract. Footnotes 25 and 26 in the case are extremely 
important. Footnote 25 reads: “Our opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional remedies 
to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing 
remedies prove inadequate; the suitability of such remedies may be determined in later cases in light 
of the factual setting in which they arise”3. Footnote 26 reads: “We do not pass upon the question 
whether, in the absence of an express or implied contractual obligation, a party to a nonmarital 
relationship is entitled to support payments from the other party after the relationship terminates”4. 
 
Footnote 25 gave Michelle the opportunity to seek equitable remedies in addition to contractual ones, 
when she sought relief in the Superior Court of California to which the case had been remanded. 
That court, not having been convinced of the existence of any kind of agreement between the couple, 
gave Michelle the amount of money she would need to educate herself so that she could be 
employable5. Lee Marvin appealed that decision to the California Court of Appeals, which reversed 
the Superior Court’s decision, basing its holding on the court’s belief that the monetary award was 
not based on any recognizable doctrine other than finding an equitable resolution of the conflict6. 
Thus, after years of litigation, Michelle Marvin received no compensation. 
 
Even though the plaintiff lost, the doctrine that was established has had an enormous impact on the 
law. The decision by the Supreme Court of California is important for recognizing that there can be 
legal consequences to two adults living together in a non-marital relationship. In particular, the court 
specifically allows non-marital couples who live together the power to arrange their lives using 
contract principles. In addition, the court also permits the judicial application of equitable remedies if 
facts permit it. 
 
                                                 
3 Id. at 123. 
4 Id. 
5 Today, such an award in a divorce case would be considered “rehabilitative alimony.” 
6 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
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In Marvin the Supreme Court of California recognized the rights of non-marital couples to sue each 
other for compensation if the facts support either contract or some equitable doctrine. But, a major 
question is the extent to which giving non-marital couples such rights makes contract cohabitation 
the functional equivalent of marriage? It must be remembered that the status of marriage in the 
United States provides the married couple with many rights by operation of law. By that I mean that 
the state imposes upon married couples certain responsibilities, like financial support, as well as 
providing them with certain rights and protections, like state inheritance laws and benefits under 
federal laws, like social security and pensions. For example, some state inheritance laws provide that 
a widow or widower receives the total estate if the decedent dies intestate (without leaving a will) 
and without leaving any children. Some states provide that a widow or widower receives half of the 
decedent’s estate if the decedent dies intestate and with surviving children. Further, state wrongful 
death statutes (providing a civil cause of action to a surviving spouse against a person who caused 
the death of the spouse) are ordinarily restricted to married persons. Also, wives and husbands are 
considered next of kin, when that status is important and carries authority, like signing medical and 
hospital documents. 
 
Footnote 26 stated that the court was not deciding whether upon termination of any cohabitation 
agreement, which made no provision for support, there would be a state imposed obligation. In 
other words, the court was in effect saying that it was not deciding whether the model for divorce 
would apply to contract cohabitation. At least three states have applied marital property concepts to 
the distribution of property upon the termination of a cohabitation agreement7. Although 
Massachusetts was willing to enforce an express contract cohabitation, it was unwilling to apply 
principles of Massachusetts divorce law on the assignment of property to cohabitants. In Wilcox v. 
Trautz8, Justice Greany wrote: 
 
Social mores regarding cohabitation between unmarried parties have changed dramatically in recent 
years and living arrangements that were once criticized are now relatively common and accepted. 
With the prevalence of nonmarital relationships today, a considerable number of persons live together 
without benefit of the rules of law that govern property, financial, and other matters in a marital 
relationship (…). Thus, we do well to recognize the benefits to be gained by encouraging unmarried 
cohabitants to enter into written agreements respecting these matters, as the consequences for each 
partner may be considerable on termination of the relationship or, in particular in the event of the 
death of one of the partners (…). This may be especially important in a jurisdiction like Massachusetts where 
we do not recognize common law marriage, do not extend to unmarried couples the rights possessed by married 
couples who divorce, and reject equitable remedies that might have the effect of dividing property between 
unmarried parties9 (emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
7  See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995); Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984); Shuraleff v. 
Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Pickens v. Pickens, 
490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986).  
8 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998). 
9 Id. at 144-45. 
 5
InDret 2/2007  Sandford N. Katz 
There is no question that marriage in the United States is the preferred legal status for adults. 
Throughout family law, there is evidence of this through the application of rebuttable legal 
presumptions. For example, there is the rebuttable legal presumption that an adult male and an adult 
female living together are presumed to be married. There is a presumption that a marriage is legal. 
Further there is a presumption that in a case of a series of marriages that the most recent marriage is 
legal. Children born of a marriage are presumed the legitimate children of that marriage. These 
presumptions, in addition to being a convenient procedural device should there be litigation, are a 
reflection of both popular beliefs and of social values having to do with a preference for persons 
acting morally and legally10. 
 
The decision in the Marvin case had a ripple effect. Following that case, similar cases were brought 
before other state courts, and for the most part, state courts sanctioned contract cohabitation as a 
alternative model for couples to utilize if they did not wish to marry11. But it is important to 
emphasize that contract cohabitation was a private arrangement totally dependent on the couple’s 
contract or conduct. If neither an express nor implied contract could be proven, there was no default 
to a legal model, like marriage. And, because of that contract cohabitation relationship can be 
vulnerable, leaving individuals unprotected, the actual outcome for Michelle Marvin in the Marvin 
case. 
 
 
3. The ALI principles on domestic partnerships 
 
The decision in Marvin, although at first heralded as a major step in the direction of protecting non-
married cohabitants, especially women, has been criticized, especially for its emphasis on the 
conventional principles of contract as a model. Professor Ira Ellman has been one of the critics who 
has written about the deficiencies in using the bargained-for exchange model of contracts, 
particularly because he feels that non-married couples do not think in terms of contract when they 
begin their intimate relationship and do not, as a general rule, enter into express contracts12, Further, 
he believes that the fundamental principles upon which the common law of contracts rest, namely 
                                                 
10 See KATZ, supra note 1, at 27. 
11 See, e. g., Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); Glasco v. Glasco, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); 
Watts v. Watts. 405 N.W. 2d 303 (Wis. 1987). Minnesota and Texas require cohabitation agreements to be in writing. 
See Minn. Stat.§ 513.076 (2002) and Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 26.01(b)(3) (2002). New York will enforce an express 
contract, but not an implied one. See Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N. Y. 1980). In that case the New York 
Court of Appeals stated, “Absent an express agreement, there is no frame of reference against which to compare the 
testimony presented and the character of the evidence that can be presented becomes more evanescent. There is, 
therefore, substantially greater risk of emotion-laden afterthought, not to mention fraud, in attempting to ascertain by 
implication what services, if any, were rendered gratuitously and what compensation, if any, the parties intended to 
be paid.” Id. at 1157. 
12 See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2001). The entire 
issue of Number 5, October 2001, of the Notre Dame Law Review is devoted to articles on Marvin v. Marvin. 
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fulfilling parties’ expectations by ordering their relationship through a bargained- for exchange, is 
inappropriate for cohabitation; “The successful intimate relationship is reciprocal, but not 
contractual”13, he wrote. It is that theory, basically rejecting contract and adopting a status-based 
approach that forms the basis for the American Law Institute’s (ALI) codification of the rules 
regulating cohabitation arrangements in its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution14 of which 
Professor Ellman was the Reporter. Section 6.03 reads as follows: 
 
§ 6.03 Determination That Persons Are Domestic Partners 
(1) For the purpose of defining relationships to which this Chapter applies, domestic partners are two persons 
of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary 
residence and a life together as a couple. 
(2) Persons are domestic partners when they have maintained a common household, as defined in Paragraph 
(4), with their common child, as defined in Paragraph (5), for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a 
duration, called the cohabitation parenting period, set in a rule of statewide application. 
(3) Persons not related by blood or adoption are presumed to be domestic partners when they have maintained 
a common household, as defined in Paragraph (4), for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a duration, 
called the cohabitation period, set in a rule of statewide application. The presumption is rebuttable by evidence 
that the parties did not share life together as a couple, as defined by Paragraph (7). 
(4) Persons maintain a common household when they share a primary residence only with each other and 
family members; or when, if they share a household with other unrelated persons, they act jointly, rather than 
as individuals, with respect to management of the household. 
(5) Persons have a common child when each is either the child's legal parent or parent by estoppel, as defined 
by § 2.03. 
(6) When the requirements of Paragraph (2) or (3) are not satisfied, a person asserting a claim under this 
Chapter bears the burden of proving that for a significant period of time the parties shared a primary residence 
and a life together as a couple, as defined in Paragraph (7). Whether a period of time is significant is 
determined in light of all the Paragraph (7) circumstances of the parties' relationship and, particularly, the 
extent to which those circumstances wrought change in the life of one or both parties.  
(7) Whether persons share a life together as a couple is determined by reference to all the circumstances, 
including: 
(a) the oral or written statements or promises made to one another, or representations jointly made to third 
parties, regarding their relationship; 
(b) the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances; 
(c) the extent to which their relationship fostered the parties' economic interdependence, or the economic 
dependence of one party upon the other; 
(d) the extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and assumed specialized or collaborative roles in 
furtherance of their life together; 
(e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of either or both parties;  
                                                 
13 Id. at 1375. 
14 The American Law Institute adopted and promulgated the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS on May 16, 2000. They were published in book form with 1187 pages by Matthew Bender & 
Co., Inc. in 2002. The Comments to each section contain an extraordinary amount of research, which includes social 
science data, case law and statutes. 
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(f) the extent to which the parties acknowledged responsibilities to each other, as by naming the other the 
beneficiary of life insurance or of a testamentary instrument, or as eligible to receive benefits under an 
employee benefit plan; 
(g) the extent to which the parties' relationship was treated by the parties as qualitatively distinct from the 
relationship either party had with any other person; 
(h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties' relationship; 
(i) the parties' community reputation as a couple;  
(j) the parties' participation in a commitment ceremony or registration as a domestic partnership; 
(k) the parties' participation in a void or voidable marriage that, under applicable law, does not give rise to the 
economic incidents of marriage; 
(l) the parties' procreation of, adoption of, or joint assumption of parental functions toward a child; 
(m) the parties' maintenance of a common household, as defined by Paragraph (4). 
 
 The Comment to Section 6 explains the text: 
 
b. This section's relationship to existing law. In the United States, courts generally rely upon contract law when 
they conclude that cohabiting parties may acquire financial obligations to one another that survive their 
relationship. The great majority of jurisdictions recognize express contracts, and only a handful of them 
require that the contract be written rather than oral. Jurisdictions split on whether to recognize implied 
contracts. Those that do recognize implied contracts differ in their inclination to infer contractual undertakings 
from any given set of facts. Some courts reach much further than others. In doing so, they appear to vindicate 
an equitable rather than a contractual principle. That is, having concluded that a particular set of facts 
demands a remedy, they may stretch ordinary contract principles to fit the remedy within a contractual rubric. 
This result is not surprising. Parties may share their lives for many years without having any clear agreement, 
express or implied, that sets out the financial consequences of terminating their relationship. To find such an 
agreement may therefore require filling many gaps with terms that flow more from the court's sense of 
fairness than from any mutual intentions inferable from the parties' conduct. 
 
This section approaches the matter in a more straightforward manner. It identifies the circumstances that 
would typically lead such a court to find a contract, and defines those circumstances as giving rise to a 
domestic partnership. Remedies then follow unless the parties have made an enforceable contract to the 
contrary. In formulating a rubric combining expansive notions of contract with equitable remedies, one court 
observed that it is appropriate in these cases to presume "that the parties intend to deal fairly with each other." 
This suggests that, as in marriage, in the ordinary case the law should provide remedies at the dissolution of a 
domestic relationship that will ensure an equitable allocation of accumulated property and of the financial 
losses arising from the termination of the relationship. The result, in comparison with a narrow contractual 
approach, is a system that places the burden of showing a contract on the party wishing to avoid such fairness-
based remedies, rather than imposing it on the party seeking to claim them. 
 
This section thus does not require, as a predicate to finding the existence of a domestic partnership, that the 
parties had an implied or express agreement, or even that the facts meet the standard requirements of a 
quantum meruit claim. It instead relies, as do the marriage laws, on a status classification: property claims and 
support obligations presumptively arise between persons who qualify as domestic partners, as they do 
between legal spouses, without inquiry into each couple's particular arrangement, except as the presumption 
is itself overcome by contract. This approach reflects a judgment that it is usually just to apply to both groups 
the property and support rules applicable to divorcing spouses, that individualized inquiries are usually 
impractical or unduly burdensome, and that it therefore makes more sense to require parties to contract out of 
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these property and support rules than to contract into them. This approach, of course, demands careful 
attention to the factors required to establish a couple's status as domestic partners. Although not always 
articulated in this way, several American jurisdictions follow a status approach similar to that adopted in this 
section, as do several Canadian provinces, Australian states, and some European countries. Finally, some 
American states that follow a contractual approach reach the same or similar. 
 
 § 6.04 Domestic-Partnership Property Defined 
(1) Except as provided in Paragraph (3) of this section, property is domestic-partnership property if it 
would be marital property under Chapter 4, had the domestic partners been married to one another 
during the domestic-partnership period. 
(2) The domestic-partnership period (a) starts when the domestic partners began sharing a primary 
residence, unless either partner shows that the parties did not begin sharing life together as a couple 
until a later date, in which case the domestic-partnership period starts on that later date, and (b) ends 
when the parties ceased sharing a primary residence. For the purpose of this Paragraph, parties who are 
the biological parents of a common child began sharing life together as a couple no later than the date 
on which their common child was conceived. 
(3) Property that would be re-characterized as marital property under §4.12 if the parties had been 
married, is not domestic partnership property. 
 
 § 6.05 Allocation of Domestic-Partnership Property 
Domestic-partnership property should be divided according to the  principles set forth for the 
division of marital property in section 4.09 and § 4.10.[These sections follow.] 
  
§ 4.09 Division of Marital Property Generally 
(1) Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this section, marital property and marital debts are divided at 
dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in value, although not necessarily identical in 
kind. 
(2) The spouses are allocated net shares of the marital property or debts that are unequal in value if, and 
only if, one or more of the following is true: 
(a) Pursuant to section 5.10, section 5.11, or section 5.14, the court compensates a spouse for a loss 
recognized in Chapter 5, in whole or in part, with an enhanced share of the marital property. 
(b) Pursuant to section 4.10, the court allows one spouse an enhanced share of the marital property 
because the other spouse previously made an improper disposition of some portion of it. 
(c) Marital debts exceed marital assets, and it is just and equitable to assign the excess debt unequally, 
because of a significant disparity in the spouses' financial capacity, their participation in the decision to 
incur the debt, or their consumption of the goods or services that the debt was incurred to acquire. 
d) Debt has been incurred to finance a spouse's education, in which case it is treated as the separate 
obligation of the spouse whose education it financed. 
(3) When a "deferred-sale-of-family-residence order" is made under section 3.11, any resulting 
enhancement in the residential parent's property share is additional child support, whether or not it is 
recognized as such in the formal child-support award, and therefore no adjustment is required under 
this section to offset it. 
 
§4.10 Financial Misconduct as Grounds for Unequal Division of Marital Property 
(1) If one spouse, without the other spouse's consent, has made gifts of marital property to third parties 
that are substantial relative to the total value of the marital property at the time of the gift, the court 
should augment the other spouse's share of the remaining marital property by one-half of the value of 
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such gifts. This Paragraph applies only to gifts made after a date that is set by counting back, from the 
date on which the dissolution petition is served, a fixed period of time specified in a rule of statewide 
application. 
(2) If marital property is lost, expended, or destroyed through the intentional misconduct of one spouse, 
the court should augment the other spouse's share of the remaining marital property by one-half the 
value of the lost or destroyed property. This Paragraph applies only to misconduct after a date that is set 
by counting back, from the date on which the dissolution petition is served, a fixed period of time 
specified in a rule of statewide application. 
(3) If marital property is lost or destroyed through the negligence of one spouse, the court should 
augment the other spouse's share of the remaining marital property by one-half the value of the lost or 
destroyed property. This Paragraph applies only to negligence that took place after service of the 
dissolution petition. 
(4) If a spouse is entitled to a remedy under Paragraph (1) or (2), or would have been entitled to a 
remedy had concealed or conveyed property not been recovered, the court should enlarge that spouse's 
share of the marital property by an amount sufficient to offset all reasonable costs, including 
professional fees, which that spouse incurred to establish or remedy the improper concealment or 
conveyance, whenever the court also finds that the other spouse's concealment or conveyance either 
(a) had the purpose of denying the first spouse his or her share of the marital property at dissolution, or 
(b) was undertaken with knowledge that such denial was its likely effect. 
(5) Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) may be applied to gifts, misconduct, or neglect that occurred prior to the 
date specified in the statewide rule required under those sections, if facts set forth in written findings of 
the trial court (section 1.02) establish that their application to the earlier incidents is necessary to avoid a 
substantial injustice. 
(6) If there is insufficient marital property for an adjustment in its allocation to provide the appropriate 
remedy under this section, the court may achieve an equivalent result by (a) making an award to one 
spouse of some portion of the other's separate property, as allowed under section 4.11, or, if the 
available separate property is also inadequate for this purpose, (b) requiring one spouse to make 
equitable reimbursement to the other in such installment payments as the court judges equitable in light 
of the financial capacity and other obligations of the spouse making reimbursement. 
 
The ALI Principles on Domestic Partnerships quoted above have been severely criticized by 
Professor Elizabeth Scott and Professor Marsha Garrison. Professor Scott, who finds the Principles 
“unnecessarily heavy handed and paternalistic”15. Professor Garrison takes the Principles to task for 
their approach, which she asserts are based on “equivalence [to marriage] and practicality [in 
establishing the relationship”16. She has attacked the social science data, calling it misleading.  She 
has written that having domestic partnerships as the functionally equivalent to marriage by applying 
property and support rules for divorcing couples to domestic partnerships is inappropriate for a 
variety of reasons. Basing her conclusions on her extensive social science research all found in the 
footnotes to her study, she writes that cohabitation is different from marriage in that cohabitation is 
usually short-lived. “Cohabitants tend to be younger and less prosperous than married couples; they 
                                                 
15 Elizabeth Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 331, 349 (Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, ed. 2006) 
16 Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters:: What’s Wrong with the ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposals, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY, supra note 1, at 307. 
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are much less likely than married couples to have children, to pool their resources, to feel secure and 
unconflicted in their relation-ships, to value commitment, or to express commitment to their 
partners. They are more likely than married couples to be in a physically abusive relationship, and 
less likely to demonstrate sexual fidelity”17. 
 
Further, Professor Garrison has written that from a comparative law and comparative religious 
perspective, the marriage is based on contract. She also points out that the ALI proposals conflict 
with the ideal of individual autonomy, which she writes is an important value in liberal societies and 
one that should be preserved, not abandoned. She concludes her study with a strong argument for 
preserving marriage, supporting her conclusion with solid social science findings illustrating all the 
advantages associated with marriage. She supports each of her statements with a footnote citing 
social science research, which she explains: 
 
“Young American adults continue to describe a good marriage as one of their most important goals, and 
believe that marriage confers a wide range of private and public benefits. The evidence justifies their 
enthusiasm. Those who are married live longer and are less likely to become disabled than the unmarried; 
they get more sleep, eat more regular meals, visit the doctor more regularly, and abuse addictive substances 
less frequently. Even after controlling for age, married men earn more than either single men or cohabitants, 
and they are less likely to lose their earnings through compulsive gambling. Married couples also have a 
higher savings rate and thus accrue greater wealth than the unmarried. Married individuals rate their 
happiness and mental health more highly than the unmarried. They experience less domestic violence and 
greater physical security. Although a high divorce rate, rising rates of cohabitation, and later marriage have 
all weakened both the stability and status linked with marriage, marriage is still associated across nations 
and cultures with higher levels of subjective well-being”18. 
 
It is hard to quarrel with Professor Garrison’s conclusions, given their solid foundation. It is often 
stated that marriage in the United States has moved from status to contract, over time. Yet the truth 
of the matter is that the relational and contractual aspects of marriage have lived side by side 
relatively undisturbed for years. Two cases illustrate this point: Ponder v. Graham19, a Supreme Court 
of Florida case decided in 1851, and Maynard v. Hill20, a United States Supreme Court case decided 
thirty-seven years later. In Ponder the Supreme Court of Florida held that marriage, being a contract, 
could not be dissolved by the Florida legislature. In Maynard, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the legislative assembly of the territory of Oregon had the authority to dissolve the matrimonial 
bonds between Mr. Maynard and his wife.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17Id. at 308-09. 
18 Id. at 323-24. 
19 4 Fla. 23 (1851). 
20 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
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It was in that case that Mr. Justice Field wrote the famous quotation about marriage: 
 
“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and 
civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. 
The body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to 
constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present 
and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for the dissolution”21. 
 
As I have written elsewhere, “In contemporary times (…) it is difficult to fit marriage neatly into the 
legal construct called contract. Normally, contract law assumes freedom of contract, party autonomy, 
and equal bargaining power. The marriage contract is not totally free of governmental regulation 
and therefore parties have limited freedom of choice”22. Monogamy, age and family relationships are 
obvious limitations. But people do have choice. Modern marriage ceremonies often involve couples 
expressing vows, not necessarily about obedience of dependency, but about mutual respect for each 
other and sometimes about each spouse’s responsibility. If contract is about relationships, and I think 
that fundamentally that is its basis, marriage fits into the category of an intimate relationship, based 
on a commitment involving affection, trust, fidelity and respect. 
 
Where the law prevents individuals of the same-sex from entering into marriage, which is the case in 
all but one state, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in the United States an alternative is now 
available. 
 
 
4. Registered domestic partnerships 
 
Marvin laid the predicate for Registered Domestic Partnership legislation in the United States. The 
main feature of a registered partnership is that it formalizing a non-marital relationship that would 
otherwise have to be proven in order for the individuals in that relationship to have rights and 
responsibilities. It is a model for same-sex couples to use to formalize their relationship.  
 
Registered domestic partnerships began as a status recognized by cities and municipalities and were 
designed to give employees of local government economic benefits ordinarily reserved for married 
couples. For the most part, individuals who registered were living in a same-sex relationship and 
would not be able to marry, thus preventing them from receiving the benefits of marriage, primarily 
health insurance. 
 
In addition, certain private corporations also recognized the status for purposes of providing health 
insurance for their employees’ partners. Adopting this status was not without its difficulties. In 
                                                 
21 Id. at 205 
22 See KATZ, supra note 1, at 36-37. 
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addition to moral objections, there were economic ones. For a governmental unit or corporation to 
expand employee benefits so as to provide health care, for example, for an employees partner would 
increase costs23. 
 
The registered domestic partnerships available in certain cities, provided the first step for states to 
embrace the concept and even broaden its scope to include matters beyond the obvious economic 
ones like sick leave to aid an ailing partner, visitation rights in hospitals when the partner is a 
patient, medical decision-making, etc. The major question for states was whether registered domestic 
partnerships should be available to couples, who could marry, but chose not to and thus making that 
relationship an alternative to marriage, or whether it should be limited to individuals who were 
prevented from marrying, like same-sex couples. Regardless of the answer to the question of who 
could enter into the relationship, the bigger issue was whether registered domestic partnerships 
should mirror marriage? 
 
By 2007 at least seven American jurisdictions, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and Vermont have enacted some form of registered domestic 
partnership statute24. The Hawaii and Vermont versions of domestic partnership legislation were the 
result of two court cases in which same-sex couples sued to obtain marriage licenses. The couples 
were refused licenses and sought relief in the state courts. After litigation through the courts in 
Hawaii, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Miike25 held that denying the couples the right to vote 
violated the state’s equal protection clause in its constitution. In 1998, a year following the Miike 
decision, the Hawaii legislature enacted its Reciprocal Beneficiary Law, which provided same-sex 
couples with certain economic benefits26. In 1998, Hawaii citizens voted to amend its constitution to 
limit marriage to one man and one woman27. Later, the Hawaiian legislature passed a domestic 
partnership law entitled, “Reciprocal Beneficiary Law,” which provided certain persons certain 
                                                 
23 For a general discussion of these issues, see Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation 
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001). 
24 See the following statutes: 
Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ch. 572C-1 to 7 (1997) 
Vermont Civil Unions Act, Pub. Act 91 H. 847, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves. 
Vermont Reciprocal Beneficiaries Statute, Vt. St. T. 15 § 1301-6 (1999); 18 § 1853 (1999); 18 § 5220 (1999); 18 § 5240 
(2006); 18 § 1852 (2006) 33 § 7301 (1999); 33 § 7306 (1999); 15 § 1101 (2006).   
California Family Code §§ 297; 297.5; 298; 298.5; 299.5; 299.6 (2004). 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 (2004. 
California Code § 1714.01 (2006). 
Connecticut General Statutes, T. 46B, Ch. 815F, § 46b-38aa to 46b-38pp (2006. 
District of Columbia, Tit. 26 Ch. 8A, §§ 26:8A-1 to 12 (2001. 
Maine Domestic Partner Registry, 22 Maine Revised Statutes c. 701, section 2710.  
New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 26:8A-1 to 12 (2006). 
25 Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
26 See HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 572C-1 to -7 (Michie Supp. 1998). 
27 See HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23. 
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rights and benefits ordinarily attached to marriage. Unlike other domestic partnership schemes, the 
Hawaiian law did not limit its coverage to adults who could not marry because of sex, but included 
persons who could be related to each other, like a mother and a son, and changed its probate code to 
include reciprocal beneficiary wherever the word “spouse” was stated. The key to the Hawaiian law 
was economic dependency. 
 
In 1999 Vermont, a New England state known for its liberal political leanings was faced with a 
challenge to its constitution. Same-sex couples sought to obtain marriage licenses and were denied. 
The case went through the Vermont courts and eventually went before the Vermont Supreme Court. 
That court held that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples violated the Common Benefits Clause 
of its state constitution28. The court then went on to state that the judiciary was not the proper venue 
for the couples to seek relief. Rather, the state legislature was the appropriate body to act. And, act it 
did with the enactment of the Vermont Civil Union Statute29. That statute provides same-sex 
partners with the benefits, protections and responsibilities ordinarily reserved to married couples.  
 
Unlike the legislatures in Vermont and in Hawaii, which basically responded to the courts in their 
domestic partnership legislation, California’s legislature took it upon itself to enact its registered 
domestic partnership law, and it did so through a series of incremental steps beginning in 1999 and 
culminating in a law signed by the California governor in 2003, which Professor Blumberg described 
as “a shadow institution of marriage”30. In the 2001 legislation, registered domestic partners were 
granted “the right to use stepparent adoption procedures; sue for wrongful death or infliction of 
emotional distress for the injury or death of a partner; be treated as a dependent or a partner for 
purposes of group health and disability insurance; file for state disability benefits on behalf of a 
mentally disabled partner; be appointed conservator for an incapacitated partner; use sick leave to 
care for an ill partner or partner’s child; use statutory form wills and be appointed as an 
administrator or a partner’s estate; receive unemployment benefits on moving to accompany a 
partner to a new job; and receive continued health insurance as a partner of a deceased state 
employee or retiree”31. Ultimately registered domestic partners were treated as intestate heirs for 
each other32. 
 
 
                                                 
28 See Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
29 Vermont Civil Unions Act, Pub. Act 91 H. 847, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves. 
30 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner  
Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1561 (2004). 
In that excellent article, Professor Blumberg not only analyzes the California Registered Partnership Act, providing a 
detailed legislative history of the act, but also analyzes the Canadian experience. Professor Blumberg spent thirteen 
years working on the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, nine of them as a 
reporter. Id. at 1594, n. 204. 
31 Id. at 1560. Professor Blumberg gives a statutory citation to each of these benefits. 
32 Id. at 1561. 
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5. Beyond: same-sex marriage 
 
Twenty-seven years after the California Supreme Court decided Marvin v. Marvin, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 
(Mass. 2003). To me that decision may do to the regulations of state marriage laws what Marvin did 
to the regulation of marriage-like relationships. Goodridge got society thinking seriously about same-
sex marriage, and that case, like Marvin, provoked state legislatures to act. Unlike the mostly positive 
reaction to Marvin, however, the legislative response to Goodridge was negative. 
 
In Goodridge, seven same-sex couples including business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, 
educators, therapists and a computer engineer, all in long-term committed relationships who were 
denied marriage licenses because they were wished to marry a person of the same sex sued the state, 
arguing that their denial of a marriage license violated the liberties and equality afforded them under 
Article 1 of the Massachusetts Constitution. The state made three basic arguments: (1) the state’s 
interest in regulating marriage is based on the traditional concept that marriage’s primary purpose is 
procreation; (2) the traditional marriage between man and woman provided the optimal setting to 
raise children, and therefore, the state had an interest in encouraging such a union; (3) allowing 
same-sex couples to marry would undermine the institution of marriage, and the state has an interest 
in preventing that from happening. The Supreme Judicial Court was not persuaded by those 
arguments, and held that the state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage did not pass rational basis 
scrutiny.  
 
Throughout her opinion, Chief Justice Marshall refers to marriage as “civil marriage.” I think that is 
important because I believe she did not wish to give the impression that she was unaware of strongly 
held religious views. Indeed, in the opening two paragraphs of the opinion, she wrote:  
 
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures 
love and mutual support; it bring stability to our society. For those who choose to marry, and for their 
children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes 
weighty legal, financial, and social obligations. The question before us is whether, consistent with the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits and obligations 
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may 
not. The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the 
creation of second-class citizens. In reaching our conclusion we have given full deference to the arguments 
made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying 
civil marriage to same sex couples. 
 
We are mindful that our decision marks a change in the history of our marriage laws. Many people hold 
deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one 
man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, 
and ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that homosexual persons 
should be treated no differently than their heterosexual neighbors. Neither view answers the question 
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before us. Our concern is with the Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance for every person 
properly within its reach. ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral 
code’(citations omitted)33. 
 
That quotation sets the tone and approach of the whole majority opinion, which reflects a respect for 
the religious and moral views of others while maintaining its focus on civil rights under the 
Massachusetts Constitution. 
 
Unlike Marvin, Goodridge did not have a ripple effect in terms of receptivity. What it did do, 
however, was to provide an impetus to other same-sex couples to sue in other states for relief under 
the constitutions of those states. They lost in the highest courts in the State of Washington [Andersen 
v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006)], New York34, and New Jersey35 and the intermediate 
courts in Indiana36 and California37. 
 
In addition to judicial responses to Goodridge, legislators took action and a number of state 
legislatures passed laws banning same-sex marriages. Forty-one states currently have statutory 
Defense of Marriage Acts38 which limit marriage to a union between a man and a woman, all but 
three of which were passed after the federal Defense of Marriage Act in 199639. Twenty-seven states 
have similarly amended their constitutions to define marriage in a manner that unambiguously 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 See Hernandez v. Robles, 885 N.E.2d 1 (NY 2006). 
35 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006). 
36 See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. Appeals 2005). 
37 See In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. Appeals 3d District 2006). 
38 Defense of Marriage Act 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1996). The Act was passed by Congress (H.R. 3396) and 
was signed by President Clinton on September 21, 1996. Provisions of that Act read as follows: 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C 
“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public 
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or 
a right or claim arising from such relationship.” 
1 U.S.C.A. § 7 – Definition of “marriage” and “spouse” 
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.” 
39 National Conference of State Legislators, Same Sex Marriage (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm . See, e.g., Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1 (1997) (“(a) Only a female may 
marry a male. Only a male may marry a female. (b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana 
even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.”). 
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excludes same sex couples40. Arizona is the only state where a ballot measure proposing a 
constitutional amendment to prohibit gay marriage has failed41. 
 
The road from Marvin v. Marvin to Goodridge v. Department of Public Health took over a quarter of a 
century on which to travel. I connect the cases because, not only was each path-breaking, but they 
relate to the recognition of non-traditional family relationships. Although other cases, like Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a Texas law that 
made sodomy between two consenting males a crime was unconstitutional, might have provided a 
major impetus to the Goodridge majority, I think that creative lawyering, that is, thinking beyond 
traditional models or paradigms was at work. In the end, Marvin and Goodridge supported the legal 
recognition of human connections, which, in certain respects, follows tradition, but in another way 
represents new directions for family law in the United States. 
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